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China’s air transportation has experienced rapid growth and major reforms in the past three decades,
some of which have been partially successful and are still ongoing today. The paper aims to analyze
China’s air deregulation experience over the last two decades and its impact on airline competition from
a geographical perspective. After the establishment of the ‘‘Big Three’’ in 2002, the paper reveals that
there has been a trade-off between the extent of deregulation and airline competition in China because
the central government has tended to strengthen the ‘‘Big Three’’ rather than totally open the market to
private and locally owned airlines. The paper uses each airline group as the basic unit of analysis and
reveals that (1) the air market has been more concentrated in the ‘‘Big Three’’ as a result of the process
of air deregulation; (2) airline competition in over two thirds of the airports and one half of the routes has
increased in the last 18 years, but the core airports and trunk routes are chieﬂy dominated by the ‘‘Big
Three’’. The peripheral airports and thin routes have been operated by private and locally owned airlines;
and (3) regionally, airline competition has occurred in most airports of the eastern region, and it is more
intense than in the central and western regions. But even here, competition in the eastern region has
however decreased in 1994–2012. The three main contributions of the paper are: (1) the use of two mea-
sures of competition in the airline market; (2) the analysis of the historical evolution of competition; and
(3) an understanding the role of the geography of competition in the Chinese airline market.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Deregulation was ﬁrst advocated in the U.S. in the 1970s (Kahn,
1971; Baumol, 1977) and then in other Anglo Saxon economies
(Graham, 1993; Barrett, 1997). It was seen at that time as a means
to achieve lower air fares, greater competition, improved reliabil-
ity, and better quality airline services (Goetz and Graham, 2004).
Since the 1980s, the airline industry of China has grown tremen-
dously as its economy has expanded, and the air passenger vol-
umes have increased from 11.7 billion person-km to 502.6 billion
person-km, a 43-fold increase between 1985 and 2012 (National
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013). The rapid growth of air travel
in China is a result of the increase in the numbers of ﬂights, and the
use of larger aircraft (Wang et al., 2014a). To understand this out-
come we need institutional analysis and geographical analysis. Atthis stage China’s airline deregulation is only partial because the
Government wants to protect its growing domestic market. A key
challenge for China is whether to ﬁrst open up the airlines domes-
tically and then to follow this with international agreements for
further deregulation. China’s airlines have little market power
internationally, unlike the more mature airlines in the United
States and the United Kingdom where liberalization started. The
latter two have a much more extensive international network of
routes, more market power, ﬁnancial resources and the larger
ﬂeets (Fu et al., 2010). China has not yet followed this road because
it wishes to create national champions before competing interna-
tionally. Hence the strategy of the Chinese central government
priority has been airline consolidation and a further strengthening
of the ‘‘Big Three’’ – Air China, China Southern, and China Eastern,
which has involved mergers and acquisitions of many small air-
lines (Lei and O’Connell, 2011). This institutional dimension differs
from the path taken to market led consolidation in the U.S. and
Europe.
This paper attempts to answer three key questions about these
circumstances. It will explore (a) what changes have taken place in
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organized; and (c) assessing airline competition from a geographi-
cal perspective over an 18 year period.2. Literature review
The international literature on air deregulation and its impacts
on airline competition can be divided into three main groups. The
ﬁrst group discusses the economic rationale for liberalisation
(Kahn, 2004; Goetz and Vowles, 2009; Wang et al., 2014b); the sec-
ond focuses on the spatial character of deregulation, especially on
airlines’ network characteristics (Shaw et al., 2009; Fu et al., 2010),
and this work includes a minor group that focuses on the
application of network theory to deregulation (Wang et al., 2011,
2014c; Lin, 2012). The third group refers to the decadal policy
evolution of deregulation experience from an institutional view-
point (Zhang et al., 1998; Zhang and Round, 2008; Lei and
O’Connell, 2011; Eaton, 2013; Koo and Lohmann, 2013). This paper
identiﬁes the key studies, and it takes an explicit air transport
geography bias.
Taaffe (1958) ﬁrst analyzed the airline competition of the U.S.
and its changes during 1940s and 1950s within a geographical per-
spective and using maps. Other studies have investigated the pro-
cess of air deregulation and its impacts on airline competition,
service and pricing (Hooper, 1998; Vowles, 2000; McHardy and
Trotter, 2006), focusing on the U.S. context (Fleming, 1991;
Goetz, 2002). The main argument for air transport deregulation
has been that markets are contestable, meaning that entry and exit
should be costless and easy, that sunk costs are not high, and that
the threat of entry is sufﬁcient to prevent anti-competitive strate-
gies from the incumbents (Bailey and Panzar, 1981). Although the
airline sector has many actors, it is a sector where multi ﬁrm pro-
duction is more costly than production in a single ﬁrm (Baumol,
1977), but this claim has long been disputed by Caves et al.
(1984). Brueckner and Spiller (1994) measure airline competition
from the perspective of economies of trafﬁc density versus econo-
mies of scale, and Dempsey and Goetz (1992) emphasize the role of
competition, but with limited information on the role of geogra-
phy. The literature reveals that deregulation has had both suc-
cesses and failures. In addition to the economic studies on the
subject, geographers have taken considerable interest in the airline
industry under deregulation, focusing on the connectivity and
accessibility beneﬁts of air travel, network conﬁguration (Chou,
1993; Ivy et al., 1995; Goetz and Sutton, 1997; Reynolds-Feighan,
1998; Bowen, 2002; Shaw and Ivy, 1994; Lei and O’Connell,
2011). These studies do not apply indicators (indices) measuring
historical changes in levels of airline competition, but tend to con-
centrate on the situation at one point in time.
Brazil, India and China are all large developing countries, and
each has seen rapid economic growth and so common lessons
can be learned. Brazilian deregulation began in 1992 (Koo and
Lohmann, 2013) and it did not produce an increased number of
competitor airlines, since four airlines dominate the entire
Brazilian market. Bettini and Oliveira (2008) provide empirical evi-
dence that re-regulation periods further reduced competition as
demonstrated by the supply of seats over time. This is in sharp con-
trast to China where deregulation is still ongoing. The Brazilian
experience shows that policy uncertainty can inhibit competition
in the airline market. Koo and Lohmann (2013) ﬁnd that
Brazilian domestic aviation is still undergoing major spatial
restructuring in terms of its airport hierarchy, and this might also
be occurring in China. In short, Brazil’s deregulation was not sufﬁ-
ciently effective in increasing the number of private airlines, but it
did widen airport capacity and it produced lower yields (per
passenger km), by as much as 50% (BNDES, 2010). India’s aviationsector was state controlled until the 1980s and deregulation was
introduced in the 1990s, but it has not delivered what was
expected as many private airlines have exited the market
(Nathan Associates, 2012). The experience of Brazil and India
shows that policy uncertainty inhibits the entry of new competi-
tors. The pace of these deregulation efforts will also be inﬂuenced
by (1) the deregulation experience of these countries which is far
from complete and (2) the pace of international deregulation.
Although building new airports many not indicate successful
deregulation, China is building new airports more rapidly than
both Brazil and India (The Economist, 2011).
In the case of China, some existing literature has been used to
illustrate how deregulation of the sector evolved before 2004.
Zhang et al. (1998) ﬁrst observed the air deregulation process in
China, but this work is limited to the economic aspects, and in
the update analysis Zhang et al. (2008) has included the driving
forces of air deregulation of the early 2000s. Recently two key stud-
ies (Lei and O’Connell, 2011; Eaton, 2013) have focused on policy
changes with respect to air deregulation. Furthermore, geogra-
phers ( Jin et al., 2004;Wang and Jin, 2007) have examined the spa-
tial patterns of air passenger transport in China after air
deregulation. Chi-Lok and Zhang (2009) have investigated the
effects of competition and policy changes on Chinese airport pro-
ductivity and they have explored the efﬁciency of airports is posi-
tively correlated with the process of airport localization. Fan et al.
(2014) ﬁnd that international hub airports are operated at higher
efﬁciency level than other smaller airports. In terms of airline
competition, Zhang and Chen (2003) have examined the competi-
tion in China and ﬁnd that up to 1979, the market and route entry,
frequency and price were all controlled by a centralized authority.
Zhang et al. (2013) ﬁnd different strategies have been employed for
competition by the ‘‘Big Three’’ in China’s three busiest air routes
(Beijing-Shanghai, Beijing-Guangzhou, and Shanghai-Guangzhou).
That situation reﬂects the greater market power of Air China when
compared to China Southern and China Eastern (Zhang et al.,
2014). The Chinese approach to deregulation differs from that in
western markets (U.S. and Europe) where airlines were allowed
to serve any route. As a result, Chinese carriers have enjoyed high
yields and low input prices in the domestic market, and this has led
to high proﬁtability in recent years (Wang et al., 2014b). These
conditions mean that institutional analysis of air transport
competition as carried out in the international literature is not of
central relevance here. Substantial differences in the institutions,
and other factors such as low per capita incomes, the distances
ﬂown and the airport capacity (including recent expansion) resem-
ble an economy in the early stages of development. In essence
China has an embryonic airline industry that has grown exponen-
tially in the last few decades, and one that retains strong central
control.
Existing studies (Zhang and Chen, 2003; Lei and O’Connell,
2011; Eaton, 2013) have tended to dissect the role of these reg-
ulatory strategies but they do not focus on the uneven geographi-
cal outcomes for certain Chinese regions. Moreover, many of these
studies in the ﬁeld are descriptive, and they do not take a long his-
torical horizon nor examine the changes in airline competition at
all airports and air routes. One exception is Shaw et al. (2009),
who studied the deregulation experience of China and observed
airline consolidation and the changes made by individual airlines
in network structure and hub dynamics. These authors only exam-
ine two years’ data for 2001 and 2004 (or before and after the
establishment of the ‘‘Big Three’’) in China. The paper extends this
work by considering the latest policies and changes in airline
groups, evaluating the dynamics of airline competition in a geo-
graphical context.
Hence the contribution here is ﬁrst to provide a more relevant
institutional focus and link that to a geographical insight on
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the role of deregulation on airline competition over time and
explains the deregulation and consolidation process with respect
to airlines. The fourth section introduces the data and the metho-
dology employed, and the ﬁfth section examines the overall airline
competition over time. The sixth section maps out the competitive
positions between the airlines from a geographical perspective.
Following the discussion, the conclusions of this research are sum-
marized in the ﬁnal section.
3. The deregulation process of airline industry in China
Zhang and Round (2008) and Shaw et al. (2009) analyze the
deregulation process of the air industry in China in all its aspects
over the early period (to 2004). This paper updates that analysis
by covering the more recent developments that have given prefer-
ence to the ‘‘Big Three’’, and details of the recent reforms and in the
further deregulation of the airline industry. The review is used to
identify key stages in the de-regulation policy, which will be used
in the subsequent analysis. As outlined below the air deregulation
process is divided into four stages in the paper, which reﬂect key
regulatory measures introduced by the Chinese State (Fig. 1).
3.1. Pre-reform tight regulation (before 1978)
Before 1949, air transport in China was closely related to mili-
tary needs, and civil airports were reconstructed from military air-
ports by airlines and local government together or individually.
Most airlines were controlled by the Government, except the
Southwest Airlines which was run independently from the
Government. Shortly after the founding of People’s Republic of
China (PRC) in 1949, the CAAC (Civil Aviation Administration of
China) was established, and operated under the Central Military
Commission until 1954. Before 1978, the air transport was fully
controlled by the central government under the CAAC, which oper-
ated in a military or semi-military style, collaborating with the Air
Force. Following the former Soviet aviation system, the CAAC was
responsible for planning, building and operating airports and air
routes. All the airlines and the ﬂights were centrally controlled in
a tightly regulated system.Fig. 1. Chronology of key regulatory measures3.2. Transitional stage (1979–1987)
Since China’s economic reform in 1978, the CAAC started to take
cautious measures to change the way it regulates the airline indus-
try. In 1980, the CAAC became independent from the military, and
then implemented various reform measures (to 1987) including:
separating the management of airlines, airports and the CAAC cen-
tral ofﬁce; transforming airlines into proﬁt-driven business enti-
ties; and allowing local governments to operate their own
airlines and encouraging competition (Jin et al., 2004). In 1987,
six state-owned airlines (Air China, China Eastern Airlines, China
Southern Airlines, China Southwest Airlines, China Northwest
Airlines, and China Northern Airlines) were set up. The CAAC, how-
ever, remained as both the regulator of the air transport industry
and the manager of airports, airlines, and other air transport
services.3.3. State-led consolidation and privatization (1988–2004)
Deregulation on entry, exit, private/foreign investment, airfares
and consolidation are the main features in this stage. From the
middle 1980s to early 1990s, airlines funded by local governments
and the private sector (e.g., Xiamen Airlines, Shanghai Airlines, and
Xinjiang Airlines) were permitted to enter into the commercial air
transport market. In addition, foreign capital was allowed for
investment in airlines and airports (1994). In 1997, the CAAC
started airfare deregulation by encouraging airlines to adopt price
discrimination to improve efﬁciency. During 1997–1999, the Asian
Financial Crisis and China’s domestic economic restructuring led to
a downturn for China’s air transport, with many airlines suffering
from declining demand, intensive competition and high debt-to-
asset ratios. The CAAC advocated airline consolidation to create
more cost-efﬁcient airlines that could achieve economies of scale,
and all state-owned airlines were regrouped into the ‘‘Big Three’’
airlines by 2002 (Fig. 2). Most of the merged airlines in this stage
ceased their original IATA code and brand, and their identity was
correspondingly replaced by the code of CA (Air China), CZ (China
Southern), and MU (China Eastern). Furthermore, the CAAC com-
pleted the transfer of ownership and management of all airports
(except for Beijing and Tibet airports) to local governments byby the Chinese state during 1952–2012.
Fig. 2. Chronology of entry, merger and reorganization of China’s airlines, 1984–2012. Note: The brackets contain the IATA code of each individual airline, and the IATA code
of airlines with Italic characters is ceased after the merger. The dot line represents the associated companies. The number represents the approved year of each airline ofﬁcially
and the merger year.
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vided more incentives for local governments and private invest-
ment for constructing and improving airports, and it made the
airports more ﬁnancially accountable and efﬁcient (Chi-Lok and
Zhang, 2009). In this stage, the state-led consolidation was driven
under the guidelines of the CAAC, and it was very different from
the free-market deregulation implemented in the United States
(Shaw et al., 2009), and it was completed much faster than that
in the U.S.3.4. New entrants, market-driven consolidation and deregulated
competition (2005–2012)
In 2005, the CAAC opened its civil aviation sector to private
investors, and the number of private airlines has grown rapidly,
with new airlines being established for the expanding local mar-
kets. The very broad perspective on ‘‘opening up’’ allowed local
authorities to establish their own airlines for attracting invest-
ment. Therefore, new startups have been founded jointly owned
16 J. Wang et al. / Journal of Transport Geography 50 (2016) 12–23by local government-owned enterprises and the ‘‘Big Three’’. For
example, Chongqing Airlines was established in 2007 and jointly
owned by China Southern and Chongqing Municipal Development
and Investment Company. Dalian Air and Tianjin Air are also jointly
owned by the local government and one airline from the ‘‘Big
Three’’. Most new entrants are connected to existing airlines
(Fig. 2). Since 2007, the CAAC have slowed down its rate of
approval for accepting applications for new airlines, and this is a
response to the rapid growth of airlines and a particular concern
over aviation safety. China launched safety checks after the jet
crash in Yichun (in Heilongjiang Province) in 2010, which was
operated by Henan Airlines. Market-driven consolidation has con-
tinued for two reasons. Some private airlines were facing bank-
ruptcy because of the effects of the ﬁnancial crisis (2007–2008),
and secondly, the ‘‘Big Three’’ have expanded their markets by
acquiring local/private airlines (Fig. 2). For example, Air China
acquired a majority stake in Shenzhen Airlines in 2010 and China
Eastern acquired Shanghai Airlines in 2011. The ﬁrst acquisition
was intended to expand market coverage into different regions,
and the second was directed toward reducing competition since
these two airlines are both Shanghai-based carriers. In contrast
to the state-led mergers, most airlines have retained their original
logo, IATA code and uniforms.
In summary, China’s air transportation has passed through
many changes since the foundation of new China: from a semi-
military era of strict regulation in the pre-reform People’s
Republic of China to a transitional stage, then an era of state-led
consolidation and privatization, and it is now entering an era of
market-driven consolidation, new entrants, and deregulated
competition with the full impacts yet to be realized and assessed.
This process is foremost highlighted by the transforming role of the
CAAC from being a ‘‘two-headed’’ regulator and operator to a lesser
role of supervision. The air deregulation since 1980s has been par-
tially successful, and this success has been associated with the
rapid increase of air travel demand. The curve of air passenger traf-
ﬁc in Fig. 1 was very ﬂat in the ﬁrst stage, and it then showed an
upward trend in the second stage, followed by a linear function
with a steep upward slope in the third stage and an exponential
growth function in the fourth stage. Today, there is a mixture of
airlines in China operated by the State, local government and pri-
vate business.Table 1
Statistics of the analysis data in the three years.
Year No.
Airlines
No. Airline
groups
No. Airport
cities
No.
Routes
No.
Flights
1994 21 20 100 634 7901
2004 10 9 122 843 29,359
2012 27 17 171 1146 84,982
Data source: Own calculation based on the timetable of all Chinese carriers.4. Data processing and methodology
4.1. Data processing
The study area is limited to the mainland of China excluding
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. As shown in Fig. 2, three years
are chosen for analysis, and these represent the status before and
after the state-led consolidation events of the airline industry in
China (1994 and 2004), and the latest data with new entrants
and market-driven consolidation (2012). The data are sourced from
the scheduled domestic timetable databases of all Chinese airlines
with unique IATA codes during 25th March to 27th October in each
of the three years (1994, 2004, and 2012). The timetable data
(CAAC, 1994, 2004, 2012) provides a detailed and disaggregate
description of the scheduled air supply (origins, destinations, stops,
frequencies) performed by all Chinese airlines. All the analysis in
Sections 4–6 is based on this source. Cargo carriers such as Air
China Cargo, China Cargo Air, Yangtze River Express, Jade Cargo
International, and SF Airlines are excluded from the research.
Cities are chosen for analysis as most of them have a single airport.
For those with multiple airports, the data are combined with one
entry for each city. All the stopover air routes are divided into
two air routes: from the departure city to the stopover city, andthen from the stopover city to the destination city. Each air seg-
ment is assigned with the same ﬂight frequency. Since the air pas-
senger volume of each airport (CAAC, 2013) was highly related to
the frequency of ﬂights (correlation coefﬁcient of 0.978 in 2012),
the research below uses the number of air routes and the fre-
quency of ﬂights per week to analyze the network coverage and
market structure of airlines (Table 1).
The airline group shown in Table 2 includes the core airline and
its subsidiaries and afﬁliates, where the core airline have stake
share over 50%. For example, the Air China Group included Air
China, Shenzhen Air, and Kunming Air in 2012 but only Air China
in 1994 and 2004. Similarly, the China Southern Group included
China Southern (CZ), Xiamen Air (MF), and Chongqing Air (OQ), the
China Eastern Group included China Eastern (MU), Shanghai Air
(FM), and China United Air (KN), and the Hainan Airline Group
(HNA) included Hainan Airlines (HU), Lucky Air (8L), Grand China
(CN), Beijing Capital Air (JD), and Tianjin Air (GS) in 2012. The market
share of air routes and ﬂights of the ‘‘Big Three’’ Airline Groups is
greater than that for the three individual airlines. For example,
the ‘‘Big Three’’ accounted for 73.5% of air routes and 70.9% of
ﬂights in 2012, while the three individual airlines alone accounted
for 61.6% of air routes and a much smaller 53.2% of ﬂights respec-
tively. The following analysis uses the larger airline groups as the
basic unit, instead of the individual airlines. In addition, all the
other airlines are called ‘‘private and locally owned’’ airlines in
the paper.
4.2. Competition measures
Taneja (1968) concluded that the ﬂight frequency share and the
number of competitors were the most effective explanatory vari-
ables for airline market share, which was conﬁrmed by results of
the research of Zhang et al. (2014) on competition in the airline
market. Following those leads, the research developed a market
competition index and the market concentration index to evaluate
the airline competition.
4.2.1. Market competition index
The market competition index in each airport (or air route) is
deﬁned as the number of airlines operating there, written as,
Ci ¼
XN
j¼1
aij
where aij = 1 when the airline j operates any ﬂight departing or
arriving at airport i (or on air route i) and aij = 0 otherwise. N is the
total number of airlines in the market. The market competition
index Ci is the sum of aij for airport i (or air route i) and reﬂects
how many airlines operate there. This means that the higher the
index, the more competitive the market. The market competition
of the whole aviation industry C is deﬁned as the average value
of Ci in all airports (or air routes), written as,
C ¼ 1
M
XM
i¼1
Ci
where M is the total number of airports or air routes in the market.
Table 2
A comparison of market share: individual airline vs. airline group.
Carrier % Airport cities % Air routes % Flights
1994 2004 2012 1994 2004 2012 1994 2004 2012
Air China (CA) 44.0 50.0 52.6 12.1 21.5 16.1 10.3 13.6 13.0
Air China Group 44.0 50.0 57.3 12.1 21.5 28.9 10.3 13.6 19.4
China Southern (CZ) 53.0 65.6 65.5 27.3 47 35.2 17.1 28 23.8
China Southern Group 53.0 67.2 67.3 34.2 56.5 41.8 21.3 35.1 30.4
China Eastern (MU) 29.0 56.6 61.4 13.1 31.2 29.1 10.9 20.3 16.4
China Eastern Group 29.0 56.6 69.6 13.1 31.2 31.5 10.9 20.3 21.0
Big three airlines 63.0 82.8 85.4 45.0 73.1 61.6 38.3 61.9 53.2
Big three groups 63.0 82.8 87.1 49.5 78.5 73.5 42.4 67.1 70.9
Other airlines 90.0 80.3 83.0 79.3 53.3 62.6 57.6 21.8 29.1
Data source: Own calculation based on the timetable of all Chinese carriers.
Note: Since two or more airlines are allowed to operate in the same airports and air routes, so the sum of their percentages are more than 100 percent.
Table 3
The overall competition of Chinese air industry by airline group.
Year Market competition index
(average)
Market concentration index
Airport city Air route Flight
1994 5.0 1.72 0.067
2004 3.73 1.70 0.099
2012 4.70 1.86 0.144
Data source: Own calculation based on the timetable of all Chinese carriers.
Table 4
The market structure of airline industry in China.
Type % Route % Airport city
1994 2004 2012 1994 2004 2012
Monopoly 58.7 55.8 55.9 39 24.6 21.1
Big Three 18.3 35.6 31.9 9.0 10.7 10.5
CA 4.1 4.0 7.1 5 0.8 0.0
CZ 10.4 23.1 12.2 4 4.9 4.7
MU 3.8 8.4 12.7 0 4.9 5.8
Other airlines 40.4 7.7 13.6 30.0 13.9 10.5
Duopoly 23.8 24.6 19.5 13 27.9 16.3
Three or more carriers 17.5 19.7 24.6 48 47.5 62.2
Data source: Own calculation based on the timetable of all Chinese carriers.
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Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) (Miller, 1982) is used to
measure the market concentration of any industry, written as,
HHI ¼
XN
j¼1
S2j ¼
XN
j¼1
ðXj=XÞ2
For the airline industry Sj is the market share of airline j, and
equals to its market volume (evaluated by ﬂights) Xj divided by
the overall market X. The paper normalizes to the HHI index in
order to compare it in all three years with unequal number of air-
lines, and the formular is written as:
HHI ¼ HHI 1=N
1 1=N
where the HHI index ranges from zero to 1, with the market
structure varying from one extreme where perfect competition
exists to a monopoly with effective barriers to entry. This means
that the lower the index, the more competitive the market.
It is very easy to calculate the market competition index but it
does not reﬂect each airlines market share. On the contrary, the
market concentration index gives greater weight to the competi-
tors with large market share; it however fails to consider the num-
ber of competitors, the distribution of market share of each
competitor, the impacts of a few large airlines on the market.
Hence the paper employs the two indices for evaluation of concen-
tration. The larger the number of airlines operating on the air route
(or at an airport), the higher the market competition index is and
the lower the concentration index, and so more competitive the
market.
5. Overall airline competition
5.1. Airline competition and market concentration
The number of airlines decreased from 20 to 9 during 1994–
2004 with the consolidation of regional airlines into the merger
of the ‘‘Big Three’’, and then the number rebounded back to 17 with
the entries of new airlines during 2004–2012. In terms of the mar-
ket competition index, the average airline competition at airports
ﬁrst decreased from 5.0 in 1994 to 3.73 in 2004 and then increased
back to 4.7 in 2012 (Table 3), which is still a little lower than of the
level in 1994. With regard to air routes, the market competition
index shows a similar trend, although in 2012 it is higher than it
was in 1994. On average, the number of airlines operating in air-
ports and air routes reached 4.70 and 1.86 in 2012 respectively,
which does not differ greatly from that in 1994. In other words, air-
ports and air routes based on the market competition index have
become more competitive after 2004. In all the three years, the
market concentration index is relatively low for ﬂights, whichmeans the aviation market of China is not highly concentrated
and seems competitive. Speciﬁcally, the ﬂight-based HHI index
showed a growth trend and reached 0.144 in 2012, more than
twice the level for 1994 showing the aviation market has become
more concentrated. As the market competition index shows the
air market has been slightly more competitive since 2004, while
the market concentration on ﬂights has increased two times, the
results show more airlines have entered the market, but the mar-
ket has become more concentrated due to the increased domi-
nance of the large operators. Such growth in both competition
and concentration has taken place in China, where the market is
growing exponentially and this can be partially attributed to the
air deregulation (Fig. 1).5.2. Monopoly vs. competition by airlines
During 1994–2012, most air routes and airports have become
less monopolistic or duopolistic as shown in Table 4. The percent-
age of monopoly routes and airports decreased in the 1994–2012
period. Meanwhile, the proportion of air routes and airports served
by three or more airlines has increased substantially over the same
period. The private and locally owned airlines operated most
monopoly routes in 1994, but this monopoly operation was
replaced as the ‘‘Big Three’’ moved into these markets between
Table 5
Differentiated marketing tactics: ‘‘Big Three’’ vs. private and locally owned airlines.
Airlines Flights/routes Flights/cities Market strategy
1994 2004 2012 1994 2004 2012 Network type Market
CA 11 22 50 18 65 169 Higher freq. Core airports & trunk routesb
CZ 8 22 54 32 126 225 Higher freq.
MU 10 23 50 30 86 150 Higher freq.
Othersa 6 19 23 10 34 35 Lower freq. Peripheral airports & thin routes
Data source: Own calculation based on the timetable of all Chinese carriers.
a Using the average value of all the other airlines.
b The evidence is shown in Table 7.
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analysis of routes where one airline had a monopoly. There were
641 monopoly routes in 2012, with 17.8% of them departing from
or arriving at Guangzhou (50), Beijing (47), and Shanghai (17). Of
the monopoly routes from/to Beijing, 40.4% are operated by Air
China, from/to Guangzhou 68% by China Southern, and from/to
Shanghai 100% by China Eastern. This represents the oligopolistic
power of the ‘‘Big Three’’ in their own base airports. Most of the
other monopoly routes reﬂect low levels of demand market in
small and remote airports and are operated by private and locally
owned airlines. That is well illustrated by the fact that in 2012, all
the 19 monopoly airports operated by the private and locally
owned airlines are small and mainly located in the western region
(Table 4).
There has also been a shift in the geography of competition. The
airports and air routes with the highest level of competition in
1994 were the ﬁrst-tier cities such as Beijing, Guangzhou, and
Shenzhen while the most competitive air routes were Beijing-
Harbin, Beijing-Guangzhou, and Shanghai-Guangzhou. By 2012
the top three in terms of competition were Chongqing,
Hangzhou, and Chengdu and Beijing-Shanghai, Chengdu-
Hangzhou, and Chengdu-Xi’an were the most competitive routes.
This illustrates the shift in the market to include some of the fast
growth second ranked western cities. That is conﬁrmed by the fact
that 2012 the highest values on the market concentration index
were recorded at the airports of Wenzhou, Chongqing, and
Yinchuan, and on the air routes of Chongqing-Nanjing, Chengdu-
Hangzhou, and Kunming-Xiamen.
5.3. ‘‘Big Three’’ vs. private and locally owned airlines
Although the entry of private airlines into the aviation market
has increased competition, as noted earlier some of them have
been acquired by the ‘‘Big Three’’ or have been declared bankrupt
(e.g., East Star in 2009). Private and locally owned airlines only
accounted for 29.1% ﬂights in 2012 so haven’t resulted in real
competition. As shown in Table 2, the ‘‘Big Three’’ accounted for
less than half the air routes in 1994, but this percentage grew to
78.5% in 2004, and then dropped back to 73.4% in 2012.
Conversely, the percentage of air routes operated by private and
locally owned airlines has decreased from 79.3% (1994) to 53.3%
(2004) and then back to 62.6% (2012).
If competition is evaluated by ﬂights per week, it shows a differ-
ent picture as the share of the ‘‘Big Three’’ in the market has
increased steadily from 1994 and 2004 to 2012. The ‘‘Big Three’’
operated a much higher number of ﬂights and carried a much
greater passenger share as they concentrate ﬂights in air routes
and airports with high levels of demand and hence higher fre-
quency of services (Table 5). Between 1994 and 2014, the ‘‘Big
Three’’ have greatly intensiﬁed their ﬂight frequency on those air
routes in response to the dramatic growth of air travel demand.
For example, China Southern increased its ﬂight frequency on air
routes by 5.75 times (1994–2012), and this growth is replicatedby China Eastern (4 times), Air China (3.54 times). In contrast
among other airlines the increase was just 2.83 times. The private
and local airlines (mostly new entrants) explore new markets and
multiple the routes where high service frequencies are not
required.
Hence the air deregulation policy has certainly had the effect of
increasing the number of private and locally owned airlines but
overall, the main thrust of the policy, to foster the development
of the national champions, has been effective as the overall avia-
tion market is still dominated by the ‘‘Big Three’’ because of their
incumbent advantages, especially at busy airports and on the high
demand air routes.6. Changes in the geography of competition in routes and
airports
6.1. Spatial competition
In the state-led consolidation before 2002 some monopoly air-
ports (identiﬁed on scores on the market competition index, were
located in the eastern region. Recently however most monopoly
airports are located in central and western China because of the
low demand levels for air travel in those regions (Fig. 3). In con-
trast, airports in the eastern region are usually operated by three
or more airlines. The market concentration index shows airports
and air routes in the eastern region are more competitive than
those in the central and western regions even though more and
more airports and air routes have become more competitive over
time (Fig. 4).
In order to compare the changes of airline competition in each
airport and air route over time, the 90 airports and the 418 air
routes that were operated in all the three years (1994, 2004 and
2012) were chosen for further analysis. During 1994–2012, airline
competition has increased in over two thirds of airports and one
half of the routes, as measured by both indices (Table 6).
Furthermore, the airline competition has decreased from 1994 to
2004 due to the state-led consolidation, but it has increased
between 2004 and 2012 in the less regulated air market.
Spatially, airports with decreasing airline competition are mainly
concentrated in the eastern region, while those with increasing air-
line competition in central and western regions (Fig. 5). Looking at
29 airports in the eastern region in 2012, 15 (measured on market
competition) and 14 (measured on market concentration) have
become less competitive compared to their position in 1994.
Speciﬁcally, all the headquarters of the ‘‘Big Three’’ (Beijing,
Shanghai, Guangzhou), and Hainan Airlines (Haikou) have become
more dominated by their own home-base carriers. In the western
region, looking at 33 airports, 26 (on the market competition
index) and 29 (on the market concentration index) have become
more competitive over the period 1994–2012. In the 27 airports
in the central region, 23(on the market competition index) and
21 airports (by the market concentration index) have becomemore
Fig. 3. Airline competition in each city by the market competition index 1994 (top), 2004 (center), and 2012 (bottom). Note: In the legend, when Ci = 1, the market is named
monopoly, when Ci = 2, namely duopoly, when Ci = 3 or over, namely Tripoly, when Ci = 4 or over, namely competitive market. Data source: Own calculation based on the
timetable of all Chinese carriers.
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Fig. 4. Spatial distribution of airline competition by the market concentration index. Note: In the legend, monopoly represents HHI = 1, when 0.8 6 HHI < 1, namely
monopolistic competition; when 0.6 6 HHI < 0.8, namely low competition; when 0.4 6 HHI < 0.6, namely medium competition; when 0.2 6 HHI < 0.4, high competition;
when HHI < 0.2, perfect competition. Airport in the legend represents airport city.
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Table 6
Changes of airline competition in airport cities and air routes.
Competition
change
Market competition index Market concentration index
Airport cities Air route Airport cities Air route
2004/
1994
2012/
2004
2012/
1994
2004/
1994
2012/
2004
2012/
1994
2004/
1994
2012/
2004
2012/
1994
2004/
1994
2012/
2004
2012/
1994
Increased 35.6 81.1 67.8 36.4 48.6 53.1 48.9 86.7 72.2 47.4 52.4 58.6
Unchanged 21.1 13.3 6.7 40.4 37.5 30.6 14.4 3.3 2.2 24.6 17.0 17.7
Decreased 43.3 5.6 25.6 23.2 13.9 16.3 36.7 10.0 25.6 28.0 30.6 23.7
Data source: Own calculation based on the timetable of all Chinese carriers.
Fig. 5. Spatial distribution of competition changes by the market competition index (left) and the market concentration index (right). Data source: Own calculation based on
the timetable of all Chinese carriers. Note: Airport in the legend represents airport city.
Table 7
Market shares of airlines by ﬂights in the top and bottom 100 routes. Unit: percent.
Airline Top 100 routes Bottom 100 routes
1994 2004 2012 1994 2004 2012
CA 13.9 19.3 26.4 8.4 12.1 6.3
CZ 21.5 30.0 28.2 15.9 43.3 13.7
MU 13.0 22.8 24.1 1.9 10.7 12.0
Others 51.6 27.9 21.3 73.8 33.9 68.0
Data source: Own calculation based on the timetable of all Chinese carriers.
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tral and western regions but decreased in the eastern region.
6.2. Trunk routes vs. thin routes
The top 100 routes and bottom 100 routes by frequency of
ﬂights per week can be deﬁned as trunk routes and thin routes.
In 1994, the 100 trunk routes accounted for 53.9% ﬂights and this
proportion decreased to 46.6% in 2004 and 39.1% in 2012.
Conversely, the 100 thin routes just accounted for quite a small
percentage of the total ﬂights (2.7% in 1994, 1.5% in 2004, and
0.78% in 2012). Overall, all trunk routes were operated by two or
more carriers, whereas all thin routes were operated by a single
carrier in 2012. Among the 100 thin routes, 6 routes were operated
by Air China, 12 by China Southern, 12 by China Eastern, and the
remaining 70 by private and locally owned airlines. In 1994, the
‘‘Big Three’’ shared less than a half of the number of ﬂights
(48.4%) in trunk routes and the ratio increased to 78.7% in 2012.
None of the private and locally owned airlines operated more than
50% ﬂights on any trunk routes. Consistent with results shown
above over the last 18 years, the ‘‘Big Three’’ (with the exception
of China Eastern) have increased their market share in trunk routes
and decreased their share in thin routes (Table 7), and this is the
exact reverse for private and locally owned airlines.6.3. Core airports vs. peripheral airports
Core airports and peripheral airports are deﬁned as the top and
bottom 20 airports by ﬂight frequency per week, and these
accounted for 66.6% and 0.3% ﬂights in 2012 respectively. All the
core airports were operated by more than one carrier, while 18
out of 20 peripheral airports in 2012 were operated by only a singlecarrier. The ‘‘Big Three’’ have the largest market share in the core
airports but the smaller airports are mainly operated by private
and locally owned airlines (Fig. 6). Over the last 18 years, the
‘‘Big Three’’ have increased their number of ﬂights at the 20 core
airports, up from 43.3% (1994) to 74.4% (2012). Conversely, the
percentage of ﬂights operated by private and locally owned airlines
in the peripheral airports grew from 33.9% (2004) to 68.0% (2012).
Speciﬁcally, the ‘‘Big Three’’ increased their market share in all 18
core airports, except Qingdao (slight decrease of 0.9%) and Sanya
(decrease of 50.4%). Sanya is the home-base airport of Hainan
Airlines, and this company dominates there. Among the core air-
ports, the ‘‘Big Three’’ have adopted different strategies but all ﬁnd
a way to dominate the market in their base airports. Speciﬁcally,
Air China has increased its ﬂight share in 13 core airports, China
Southern in 3 airports, and China Eastern in 9 airports.7. Conclusions and discussion
This paper has assessed the evolution of air deregulation in
China and how that has been reﬂected in airline competition.
This has been accomplished by evaluating empirical data of ﬂight
frequency per week the market share of airports and air routes
Fig. 6. Market shares of airlines in the top (left) and bottom (right) 20 cities by ﬂight frequency. Data source: Own calculation based on the timetable of all Chinese carriers.
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et al. (2009), this paper has considered competition in a spatial set-
ting in greater depth at three points in time, and it has examined
historically the effects of airline competition on market structure
for each airport and air route in the domestic air market. The mar-
ket competition index and the market concentration index have
been used to understand the geography of change.
There are three main conclusions: First, before 2002, China had
taken a state-led approach to air deregulation which differs to that
followed in the EU and U.S. After 2002, a state managed free mar-
ket approach has played an increasing role in the aviation industry
with the objective of strengthening the ‘‘Big Three’’ rather than
open the whole market to private and locally owned competitors.
Second, the analysis of market competition index shows that air-
line competition has decreased during 1994–2004 and increased
again between 2004 and 2012; this index reﬂects the number of
competitors. In contrast, the market concentration index reﬂects
market shares and it conﬁrmed airline competition decreased
between 1994 and 2012. The percentage of monopoly and duopoly
airports and air routes has also decreased. In the geographic con-
text, over two thirds of the airports, and one half of the air routes
have become more competitive (1994–2012) predominantly in the
airports of the eastern region (with the most prosperous air mar-
ket), and less intense in the central and western regions, where
competition has declined over time. Third, the ‘‘Big Three’’ are
the most competitive airlines and they dominate the aviation mar-
ket on trunk air routes and at core airports, even where many of
the routes were previously operated by the private and locally
owned airlines in 1994. By 2012 the thin air routes and peripheral
airports are now the exclusive domain of the private and locally
owned airlines. Overall, the CAAC’s role in the deregulation process
has been transformed from being a ‘‘two-headed’’ regulator and
operator to a lesser role of supervision. The deregulation process
has increased the competition level among airlines. However,
CAAC still controls the entry of airlines into major airports and
trunk air routes, and it aims to maintain the strength of the ‘‘Big
Three’’ to provide capacity for international competition, while
encouraging smaller airlines to operate on the more peripheral
routes, where levels of demand are likely to take much longer to
be established. The picture of growth and spatial change given in
this paper on the domestic airline industry in China is only part
of the story, as there is also the international aviation industry that
has developed in parallel, and the two are integrally connected. In
addition the paper did not discuss the competition of airlines in the
same airline group, which may compete with each other aggres-
sively in the Chinese aviation market.
The air deregulation process is still under development, and the
next set of decisions may involve policy attitudes to low cost car-
riers. This issue will involve fundamental questions about the
future, whether a much more liberal approach to the market andcompetition should be adopted, or whether the more centralized
state capitalist approach currently used in China can be seen as a
permanent and stable structure within which to organize such a
dynamic sector of transport.
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